全球第一智库布鲁金斯：在这个领域，中美或只能合作
综合实力排名全球第一[1]的智库布鲁金斯学会不久前发布报告，从人工智能时代的角度分析了中美竞合关系。这份题为《人工智能时代下的中美关系》（US-China Relations in The Age of Artificial Intelligence）的报告强调，人工智能技术将对中美关系造成巨大压力，但同时也为双方提供了潜在的合作机会；不应再以冷战、零和的眼光看待两国关系，对于人工智能在中美竞争中的作用，需要一个不同的视角。报告还提供了美国在人工智能发展方面加强对华合作的四个步骤建议。
[1]排名参考美国宾夕法尼亚大学“智库研究项目”（TTCSP）研究编写的《全球智库报告2018》。
编译 | 赛博安全
我们如何一路走来？
随着中国发布《 新一代人工智能发展规划 》；促进军民融合的技术发展以期降低美国的竞争优势；提出并实施“一带一路”倡议，美国一部分人担心这将使中国能够制定全球技术标准，认为美国正在失去其对中国的创新优势。到目前为止，美国的主流反应是试图减缓中国的发展，包括加强对外国核心技术投资的审查，审查中国的学术交流，有针对性地征收关税以降低中国在关键领域的竞争力，增加经济间谍活动的中国参与者的起诉，以及在反情报行动中投入更多资源。
但在自我保护的同时，美国需要避免造成自我伤害。美国的主要创新来源越来越多地来自于其技术领域，而该领域与中国密切相关。将美国技术领域与中国相隔离，将为中国竞争对手提供更多空间，减缓美国新的突破，降低美国公司的竞争力，并增加美国消费者的成本。确定出于国家安全目的而要保护的关键技术时需要精确的政策，避免一概而论进而破坏美国的创新。
注重大局
美国和中国不同于世界其他国家
美国不能在自我保护中忽视大局。虽然中美之间的竞争加剧，但两国在经济规模、创新步伐和整体国力方面正在拉大与世界其他国家的距离，这在很大程度上得益于两国的技术发展。普华永道的一项研究表明，到2030年，人工智能预计增加15.7万亿美元的全球经济，而中美两国将占据其中的70％。
中美两国在人工智能的推动下，具有其他国家无法复制的独特属性，包括世界一流的研究专长、深厚的资本池、丰富的数据、主要支持性政策环境以及竞争激烈的创新生态系统。在全球约4500家涉及AI的公司中，约有一半位于美国，三分之一位于中国。因此，虽然中美正在相互竞争，但更重要的事实是，这两个国家也在同时处于创新的前沿。纯粹竞争性的零和框架对双方而言都是不利的。
随着机器人技术的不断发展，美国和中国将率先面对由于自动化导致的失业问题。
图片来源：路透社
确定竞合领域
克服全面竞争趋势的一种方法是，中美两国更好地分享合作互利的领域，以及需要协调固有利益冲突的地方。这将使双方能够在利益一致的情况下建立合作，从而使双方更有信心处理分歧问题。
军事和安全
军事领域存在的误判风险最大，同时也最需要持续、直接、权威的双边沟通，以便更好地共享对人工智能伦理边界的理解。中美的双边关系已经面临严峻的安全困境，随着人工智能技术进一步融入武器系统，使其拥有自主能力，上述安全困境更为突显。
如果中美军队之间发生对抗，机器人和人工智能可以发挥关键作用。军备快速升级是一种严重的风险，特别是如果技术进步的速度超过了在决策流程中对人类能动性的维护速度。意外使用和迅速升级存在切实的可能性，这应该激励双方发展制定战斗中使用AI的界限。以前的军备控制条约，包括“化学武器公约”的规范性发展进程可以为中美提供可用的经验教训。
贸易
加强中美两国之间的技术竞争可能导致技术领域的割裂。通过引入5G网络，美国和中国将在主要市场和地区形成下一代移动标准、频谱分配和部署。在中美贸易持续紧张的局势下，中美都试图锁定海外5G市场，出现两种不可互操作的5G生态系统的风险越来越大。在这种情况下，一个系统可能由美国领导，并由硅谷开发的技术支持，另一个系统将由中国领导，并由其功能强大的数字平台公司提供支持。
当中美关系中政治意味不那么强烈时，两国领导人都应该审视，加速全球技术领域分化是否使中美两国最大化了自身利益。在此情况下，双方都将限制其扩张潜力：中国的市场主要是发展中国家，这些国家用于技术发展的资源有限，而美国公司主要在竞争激烈的发达市场中经营。
政治
人工智能技术可以成为加强意识形态对立的工具，特别是如果一方或双方利用这些技术干涉对方的国内政治事务。人工智能技术可能会对民主选举产生更具侵入性的干扰，包括提高对手锁定并说服特定投票团体的能力。如果外部干涉变得更加普遍，并且全世界选举结果的合法性越来越受到质疑，民主的吸引力可能会变弱，而替代模式可能会变得更具吸引力。
简而言之，人工智能技术可能会加剧中美之间的政治和意识形态紧张关系。但这一结果并非已成定局。为了减少这种可能性，需要进行认真、冷静和持续的双边接触，以确定在选举过程和政治制度中的国家干预界限。关于可接受的政府参与他国政治制度的界限的讨论可能需要从二轨开始，并在时间推移中逐渐成熟后再进入官方渠道。
社会
作为人工智能的世界领导者，美国和中国将率先应对这项新技术引发的社会混乱。虽然对失业规模的估计没有达成共识，但各种预测都令人警醒。经济合作与发展组织认为，美国有10％的工作岗位具有被自动化替代的高风险。美国前财政部长Larry Summers预测到本世纪中叶，大约三分之一25-54岁的美国男性将因人工智能的兴起而失业。上述预测同样适用于中国。对此，中美都将面临艰难的选择，例如如何改革教育制度，应对不断扩大的财富不平等，确定是否需要某种形式的普遍基本收入来维护社会凝聚力，改革社会安全网，发展新的隐私概念，为失业工人找到与社会联系的方式等。
两国还将争取抓住人工智能提供的机会来改善国情。两国都可以从医疗保健、气象模型、高效能源使用、跟踪气候变化影响、增加受教育机会、加强野生动物保护、识别和应对非法/未报告/不受管制的捕鱼等领域的数据分享和重大挑战的经验中获益。两国还可以共同制定新技术标准，这可以提高将新产品（比如无人驾驶车辆）推向市场的效率。
四步骤提高美国在AI领域
与中国合作的能力
鉴于眼前的巨大风险和机遇，以及中美同时摸索处理人工智能造成的社会混乱，两国必须就如何有效应对管理AI发展进行坦诚的讨论。这些讨论应以管理风险和抓住机遇为指导目标。许多对话可能会在政府渠道之外开始，这种情况反映了私营部门在人工智能创新中的关键作用。以下是可以采取的四项步骤建议，旨在加强美国在中美关系背景下管理人工智能及相关技术影响的能力：
1.互相保证。双方高级别官员关于人工智能和相关技术的沟通水平远远落后于这些技术可能对双边关系产生的影响。两国领导人可以共同重申他们的目标：（1）对于人工智能相关技术的引入将提高竞争力的领域，进行坦诚直率地处理和建设性地管理；（2）在更多合作有助于双方获得益处的领域中开展合作。
2.保持立场。虽然中国的研究人员和开发人员享有显著的相对优势，包括广泛的政府支持、丰富的数据和竞争激烈的创业环境，所有这些都加速了创新的步伐，但中国同时还面临一些严峻的挑战，包括：数据制度不明确以及关键的数据领域缺乏全球性企业；在获取国外尖端技术时面临更具限制的全球环境；未来，政府可能会迫使中国公司在国内采购零部件，而不是来自全球整合的供应链；政府主导投资可能导致投机热潮和萧条周期等。美国在与中国竞争中保持信心非常重要。
3.加强优势。美国在创新方面拥有三大核心优势——教育、移民和投资。美国能够吸引来自世界各地最优秀的人才，拥有世界一流的大学体系以及深厚而有效的资本池。美国需要推进积极主动的战略，以巩固这些优势——例如，通过简化优秀创新者的移民流程；加强学术界、政府实验室和私营部门之间的三角研究关系；并维持吸引资金流向美国的政策。
4.寻找伙伴。通过与盟国和伙伴的协调，美国将能够更好地协调国家出口管制、国防贸易管制和投资审查机制，以限制两用技术向中国的转移。美国将受益于与盟国加强合作，以加速人工智能在国防创新方面取得进展。
结论
在人工智能时代，任何其他国家都不会在技术发展或国家实力方面赶上美国或中国，而美国和中国各自都无法主宰或将自身意志强加于另一方。如果双方互相吸取信息领域的经验，便都会获益，但如果明面上陷入对抗或冲突，则都会受损。为使双方应对紧张局势并在利益交集领域保持开放的合作渠道，人工智能在双边关系中的作用范式需要改变。美国和中国不应以零和、冷战的方式看待人工智能，而是需要努力采取更加平衡的描述方式。在竞争激烈的时候，这种转变不会轻易或自然地发生，但转变的成本和后果应该使双方意识到其中的价值。
附英文原文
US-China Relations
in The Age of Artificial Intelligence
Authors | Ryan Hass & Zach Balin
Under President Donald Trump, great power competition has become the organizing principle of American foreign policy. This has led to near-daily invocations of the Cold War to describe the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, and to frequent analogies to an “arms race” to describe bilateral competition in advanced technologies, including quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI). Public statements and national plans from both governments have reinforced this zero-sum dynamic. Such framing has done more to conceal than clarify and, if taken to its logical end-point, will do more harm than good for the United States.
HOW DID WE GET HERE?
In March 2016, a Google system powered by an AI algorithm squared off against Lee Sedol, an 18-time world champion in the famously complex game of Go. In front of an audience of more than 280 million mostly Chinese viewers, the Google system triumphed, plunging China into what renowned technologist Kai-Fu Lee described as an “artificial intelligence fever” that “lit a fire under the Chinese technology community that has been burning ever since.”
A little over one year later, in July 2017, China unveiled its national plan for seizing the spoils of AI. The “New Generation AI Development Plan” set targets and pledged national resources, calling for China to catch up on AI technology and applications by 2020, achieve major breakthroughs by 2025, and become a global leader in AI by 2030. President Xi Jinping reinforced these themes in his 19th Party Congress speech in October 2017 and in a major Politburo study session in late October.
Further stoking unease has been some of China’s official rhetoric, which promotes military-civil fusion of technological development to degrade America’s competitive edge. Such unease has been amplified by China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, a massive global initiative that some in the United States fear will enable Beijing to set global technological standards. Cumulatively, China’s efforts have fed what Dean Garfield, president and CEO of the Information Technology Industry Council, has characterized as a newfound “hysteria” in Washington that America is losing its innovation edge to China.
Americans are unaccustomed to other countries publicly projecting plans to displace them. As former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently said, “When we see [China]…say, ‘We’re going to do whatever it takes to surpass the United States’… you’re going to get a response from the United States.”Thus far, a large part of that response has been attempting to slow China’s progress, including by tightening screening of foreign investments in core technologies, scrutinizing Chinese academic exchanges, applying targeted tariffs to reduce China’s competitiveness in key sectors, increasing prosecutions of Chinese actors involved in economic espionage, and investing greater resources in counter-intelligence operations.
To be clear, it is fair and appropriate for countries to defend their economic crown jewels from foreign exploitation or infringement. Like any other country, the United States has the right to defend itself, and should continue to do so vigorously. But in protecting itself, the United States needs to avoid inflicting self-harm. Arguments for “decoupling” the economic relationship between the United States and China—including by collapsing ICT supply chains—would do just that. America’s leading sources of innovation increasingly are found in its technology sector, which is deeply intertwined with China’s. There are high levels of collaboration between researchers and engineers in both countries, manifesting in growing numbers of jointly authored peer-reviewed academic papers and deep levels of joint investments by U.S. and Chinese venture capital firms into AI-related enterprises in both countries.
As Lorand Laskai and Samm Sacks recently argued, fencing off the U.S. technology sector from China would cede ground to Chinese competitors, slow down new breakthroughs, reduce the competitiveness of American firms, and increase costs for American consumers.Determining what key U.S. technologies to protect for national security purposes will require policy precision in order to avoid a brickbat approach that undermines American innovation. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once dubbed this the “small yard, high fence” strategy – selectively protecting key technologies, and doing so aggressively.
FOCUSING ON THE BIG PICTURE: U.S. AND CHINA SEPARATING FROM THE PACK
In the process of protecting itself, the United States must endeavor not to lose sight of the bigger picture. While competition between the United States and China is intensifying, these two powers are increasing the distance between themselves and every other country in the world in terms of economic size, pace of innovation, and overall national power. This separation of the United States and China from the rest of the pack is being fueled largely by both countries’ technology sectors. According to a widely cited study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the United States and China are set to capture 70 percent of the $15.7 trillion windfall that AI is expected to add to the global economy by 2030.
Both countries are being propelled forward in AI by unique attributes that no other country soon will replicate. These include world-class research expertise, deep capital pools, data abundance, largely supportive policy environments, and highly competitive innovation ecosystems. Of the roughly 4,500 AI-involved companies in the world, about half operate in the United States and one-third operate in China. So, while it is fair to say the United States and China are competing against each other, the larger truth is that both countries also are navigating the frontier of innovation simultaneously.
This is where a purely competitive zero-sum framing does a disservice to both. When every step forward by one is viewed as a setback for the other, there is disincentive to coordinate on shared challenges or be open to learning from the other’s experiences.
IDENTIFYING AREAS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
One way of overcoming the trend toward all-encompassing competition would be for the United States and China to develop a better shared understanding of where cooperation would be mutually beneficial and where inherent conflicts of interests will need to be managed. This would enable both sides to build cooperation where interests align, which in turn would give both sides greater confidence to deal with issues where they diverge. Below is an illustrative – not exhaustive – set of examples, broken down into four categories: military and security; trade; politics; and society.
Military and security
The military domain presents the greatest risk for miscalculation. It also is where the need is greatest for ongoing, direct, authoritative bilateral communication to develop a better shared understanding of ethical boundaries around AI, particularly given the potential implications for warfighting.
The bilateral relationship already faces an acute security dilemma, where actions on one side make the other feel less secure and push it to develop countermeasures. As AI technologies become more integrated into weapons systems and those systems gain autonomous capabilities, this security dilemma could grow more pronounced, causing each side to nationalize innovation streams and limit transparency in order to seek an edge over the other. In other words, an existing security dilemma could quickly morph into an AI nightmare.
The stakes are high. As others have pointed out, the United States and China stand on the cusp of rapid change in the conduct of war, not unlike the employment of cavalry, the advent of the rifled musket, or the merging of fast armor with air support to achieve a blitzkreig. Both countries are investing heavily to merge AI-enhanced capabilities and enable machine-based decision processes with minimal human interaction.
In the event of a confrontation between U.S. and Chinese forces (e.g., in the South China Sea), robotics and AI could play a critical role. Rapid escalation is an acute risk, particularly if the pace of technological advancements in capabilities exceeds the development of protocols for maintaining human agency in decision-making loops.
The real possibility of unintended and rapid escalation should provide incentive for both sides to begin developing boundaries around uses of AI in warfighting. The normative development process around previous arms control treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, could offer applicable lessons that the United States and China could draw from.
Trade
Intensifying technological competition between the United States and China also risks leading to separate technological spheres, with Europe, North America, South America, and Australia largely adopting American technology and standards, and Asia, Africa, and the Middle East adopting Chinese ones. The ongoing global competition between the United States and China over 5G standards may be an early indication of the battles to come over these boundaries.
Through the introduction of 5G networks, the United States and China will shape the development of next-generation mobile standards, spectrum allocation, and deployments in key markets and regions. Particularly as U.S.-China trade tensions persist, and as both Washington and Beijing seek to lock in overseas 5G markets, there is growing risk of a bifurcated, non-interoperable 5G ecosystem emerging. In such a scenario, one system likely would be led by the United States and supported by technology developed in Silicon Valley, and the other would be led by China and supported by its highly capable digital platform companies.
When a less politically charged moment in the U.S.-China relationship arrives, leaders in both countries should examine – both individually and collectively – whether or not their interests are best served by hastening the bifurcation of the global technology sector into U.S. and Chinese spheres. In such a scenario, both sides would limit their expansion potential: China’s markets primarily would be in developing countries with limited resources for technology build-out, and U.S. companies would operate mostly in developed markets where competition would be fierce.
Politics
AI technologies have the potential to be highly disruptive of political relations between the United States and China. AI technologies could become a vehicle for intensifying ideological rivalry, particularly if one or both sides harness such technologies to interfere in the other’s domestic political affairs.
Russia’s interference into America’s 2016 presidential election raised awareness of U.S. vulnerabilities on this front. As Elaine Kamarck documents, Russia used misinformation and disinformation to suppress voter turnout in targeted geographic districts and among certain demographic groups. Russia also spread derogatory information to denigrate certain candidates, foremost Hillary Clinton. What if those actions were the election interference equivalent of Lindbergh’s test flight – proof of concept, but far from realization of potential?
Going forward, artificial intelligence technologies may enable even more intrusive interference into democratic elections, including by improving an adversary’s ability to target and persuade particular voting groups. In her piece “Malevolent Soft Power, AI, and the Threat to Democracy,” Kamarck envisions a future where polling or search algorithms are linked with artificial intelligence and a human voice to call swing voters and persuade them, in real-time, that a certain candidate will harm them on the issues they identify as important and that the alternative (i.e., preferred) candidate is committed to addressing their individual concerns. She described this as “high-frequency trading in political persuasion.”Alina Polyakova classifies tactics like this as examples of “AI-driven asymmetric warfare.” In her piece “Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric Warfare,” she warns of the perils that ever-improving, low-cost commercial tools present. “Whereas most Russian disinformation content has been static,” she writes, “advances in learning AI will turn disinformation dynamic” through the creation and dissemination of manipulated video and audio.
If external interference becomes more prevalent and the legitimacy of election results around the world increasingly are called into question, democracy’s appeal could dim and alternative models (e.g., China’s economically statist and politically Leninist system) could become more attractive. This could open the door for Beijing to argue in other capitals that its model delivers higher rates of economic growth and that democratic systems are brittle against manipulation and ineffective at equitably distributing benefits within society.
To be clear, no public evidence exists to indicate that China has meddled in U.S. domestic political affairs in a manner reflecting the hypothetical scenario described above. Even absent such meddling, though, there are still significant concerns in Washington about how Beijing is harnessing AI technologies to surveil its citizens and suppress domestic dissent. These concerns reside on two levels. The first is the manner in which Beijing is perfecting its ability to track its citizens’ movements, communications, spending habits, news consumption, and so on. The second concern is that China may seek to export these practices to foreign leaders who desire tighter control over their citizens. In effect, China’s AI-driven model of intrusive surveillance could challenge America’s long-running efforts to spread democratic principles around the world. Even if this occurs more by default than design, China’s exportation of its policies and technologies to other countries could intensify ideological competition between the United States and China.
In short, there is serious risk that AI-powered technologies could inflame political and ideological tensions between the United States and China. But this outcome is not a foregone conclusion. To mitigate the possibility, there needs to be serious, sober, and sustained bilateral engagement to identify boundaries around what constitutes state interference in election processes and political systems. In 2015, for example, President Obama and President Xi agreed that government-sponsored, cyber-enabled economic espionage for commercial gain is out of bounds, and both leaders subsequently attracted other bodies such as the G-20 and the Gulf Cooperation Council to embrace a similar understanding. Reports have surfaced in recent months, however, suggesting that China has resumed government-sponsored, cyber-enabled economic espionage for commercial gain. Given the ill will within the U.S. government following reports that China may not be abiding by the 2015 cyber agreement, discussions on the boundaries of acceptable government involvement in other countries’ political systems may need to begin at the Track II level and mature over time into official channels.
Society
As the world leaders in AI, the United States and China will be among the first to confront intense social disruptions from this new technology. AI could prove to be every bit as revolutionary as the introduction of electricity or the steam engine – innovations that hastened a shift from agrarian to industrial modes of production and accelerated urbanization.
Already, a cottage industry has formed to predict the range of job losses that could result from the adoption of AI and the widening use of robotics. While there is nothing yet approaching a consensus around the scale of dislocation, the low-end projections are sobering, and the high-end estimates are frightening. At the low end, a team of researchers at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development found that 10 percent of jobs in the United States are at high risk of being automated.Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has predicted that the rise of AI could bring about unemployment for about a third of American men ages 25-54 by mid-century. Kai-Fu Lee predicts that within ten to twenty years, the United States technically will be capable of automating between 40 and 50 percent of jobs.A similar story also applies to China.
In the face of such disruptions, both the United States and China will face hard choices, such as how to reform their educational systems, cope with widening wealth inequality, determine whether some form of a universal basic income is needed to preserve social cohesion, reform social safety nets, develop new concepts around privacy, and find productive ways for displaced workers to feel connected to society.
Each country also will contend with how to seize opportunities presented by AI to improve the national condition. A prime example is health care. The U.S. and China are the world’s two largest health care markets, and both countries are projected to experience a surge in spending over the coming decades as their populations age. Both would benefit from jointly leveraging AI applications for image analysis and diagnosis, discovering cures for cancer and other diseases, and identifying the most efficient care models for treatable conditions. Beyond health care, both countries could benefit from sharing data and expertise on major challenges like weather modeling, efficient energy use, tracking the effects of climate change, increasing access to education, enhancing wildlife conservation, and identifying and responding to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Both countries also could work together on standard-setting for new technologies, which could create greater efficiencies for bringing new products, such as driverless cars, to market.
STEPS TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S ABILITY TO WORK WITH CHINA ON AI DEVELOPMENTS
Given the magnitude of risks and opportunities on the horizon, and the fact that the United States and China simultaneously will be navigating uncharted territory in dealing with the societal dislocations caused by AI, it is imperative that both countries have candid discussions about how to effectively manage AI developments. These discussions should be guided by the objectives of managing risks and seizing opportunities. Many of these conversations likely will begin outside of government channels, a circumstance that reflects the private sector’s key role in AI innovation. Baidu’s recent decision to join the U.S.-based Partnership on AI provides an encouraging example of how leading U.S. and Chinese actors can come together to establish best practices for AI systems.
The following are four recommendations of steps that could be taken to strengthen America’s ability to manage the impact of AI and related technologies within the context of U.S.-China relations:
1.Mutual reassurance. The level of senior-level official communication on AI and related technologies lags significantly behind the potential impacts these could have on the bilateral relationship. Leaders in both countries could jointly reaffirm that their objective is (1) to address forthrightly and manage constructively areas where the introduction of AI and related technologies will elevate competition and (2) to encourage collaboration in areas where both sides would benefit from greater coordination and cooperation. Such parallel messaging would create a demand signal for leading thinkers on both sides of the Pacific to prioritize these topics in upcoming exchanges.
2.Maintain perspective. Chinese AI researchers and developers are not ten-foot-tall giants. China’s plan to overtake the United States and dominate the future of AI innovation is more ambition than achievement to date. To be sure, Chinese researchers and developers enjoy significant relative advantages, including extensive government support, data abundance, and a hyper-competitive entrepreneurial environment, all of which accelerates the pace of innovation.But China’s path to unalloyed dominance is far from assured. China also confronts some serious challenges, including an uncertain data regime and lack of global players in key data sectors; government pressure on technology companies to ensure some advances serve the needs of the Communist Party; a more restrictive global environment for acquiring cutting-edge technologies abroad; the possibility that the government could, in the future, pressure Chinese firms to procure components domestically rather than from globally integrated supply chains; the risk of government-directed investment leading to speculative boom and bust cycles; and the potential for AI to become socially divisive as it is employed domestically for intrusive surveillance or targeted repression. Additionally, while much is made of China’s data abundance, it is worth bearing in mind that Google and Facebook each have more users globally on their platforms than the entire population of China, with further growth potential still. America’s confidence in its ability to compete with China matters greatly. If the United States feels back-footed by the pace of China’s technological advances, it naturally will be less comfortable exchanging lessons learned with China on shared AI-related challenges.
3.Invest in strengths. The United States holds three core advantages when it comes to innovation – education, immigration, and investment. With its ability to draw the best minds from around the world, its world-class university system, and its deep and efficient capital pools, the United States should welcome healthy and fair competition with China. The United States needs to advance a proactive strategy to build on these strengths – for example, by easing the immigration process for leading innovators; resurrecting efforts to strengthen the research triangle between academia, government labs, and the private sector; and maintaining policies that attract capital to American shores.
4.Find our friends. Through coordination with allies and partners, the United States will be better able to harmonize national export controls, defense trade controls, and investment review mechanisms to limit transfer of dual-use technologies to China. The United States will have greater impact in pressing China to curb actions it finds unacceptable if allies and partners join the chorus. The United States also would benefit from increasing collaboration with allies to accelerate AI-enabled advances in defense innovation.
CONCLUSION
In the AI age, no other country likely will catch up to the United States or China in terms of technological development or national power, and the United States and China each will not be able to dominate or impose its will on the other, at least in peacetime conditions. Both stand to gain if they find ways to learn from each other’s experiences navigating the information frontier, or to lose if they descend into unvarnished confrontation or conflict.
In order for both sides to manage tensions and maintain open channels for cooperating in areas of overlapping interest, the paradigm of AI’s role in the bilateral relationship will need to change. Instead of viewing AI in zero-sum, Cold War–like terms, the United States and China need to make deliberate efforts to adopt a more balanced narrative. At a time of intensifying rivalry, this shift will not come easily or naturally, but the costs and consequences of the alternative should awaken both sides to the value in doing so.
封面图来源：路透社
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